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 Résumé 
Les positions ontologiques et épistémologiques adoptées 
par des méthodes de conception de systèmes d'informa-
tion sont incommensurables une fois prises à leurs extré-
mités.  Les chercheurs dans des systèmes d'information 
tendent donc à se concentrer sur les similitudes entre 
différentes positions, habituellement à la recherche d'un 
simple, position d'unification.  Cependant, en se concen-
trant sur les similitudes, la clarté de l'argument fournie 
par n'importe quelle une position philosophique unique 
est nécessairement diminuée.  En conséquence, les cher-
cheurs traitent souvent les bases philosophiques des mé-
thodes de conception en tant qu'étant d'intérêt seulement 
minoritaire.  En cet article, nous avons délibérément 
choisi de concentrer sur les différences entre de diverses 
positions philosophiques.  Aller de cette position, nous 
croyons que nous pouvons obtenir une connaissance plus 
claire du comportement empirique du logiciel comme vu 
des positions philosophiques particulières.  Puisque l'évi-
dence empirique ne favorise aucune position unique, 
nous concluons cela les approches ad-hoc fournissent 
plus forte et plus théoriquement enraciné approche à la 
conception de logiciel. 
 
Mots clefs: 
Méthodes de Conception de Logiciel, Théorie Philoso-
phique, Équivalence, Epistémologie, Ontologie. 
 
 
 Abstract 
The ontological and epistemological positions adopted by 
information systems design methods are incommensur-
able when pushed to their extremes.  Information systems 
research has therefore tended to focus on the similarities 
between different positions, usually in search of a single, 
unifying position.  However, by focusing on the similari-
ties, the clarity of argument provided by any one phi-
losophical position is necessarily diminished.  Conse-
quently, researchers often treat the philosophical founda-
tions of design methods as being of only minor impor-
tance.  In this paper, we have deliberately chosen to focus 
on the differences between various philosophical posi-
tions.  From this focus, we believe we can offer a clearer 
understanding of the empirical behaviour of software as 
viewed from particular philosophical positions.  Since the 
empirical evidence does not favour any single position, 
we conclude by arguing for the validity of ad hoc ap-
proaches to software design which we believe provides a 
stronger and more theoretically grounded approach to 
software design. 
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Preface 
Philosophy should be no stranger to information systems.  
After all, the body of theory underlying programs origi-
nated from work undertaken in the philosophy of mathe-
matics in the early 20th Century.  Nonetheless, more re-
cent work has often lost sight of these foundations lead-
ing to a blurring of the distinction between the term’s 
‘software’ and ‘programs’.  In this paper, we characterise 
programs as formal descriptions of the actions of a com-
puter.  The focus of programs is thus clearly on the ac-
tions of the computer — any description with a wider 
scope falls into the category of software. 
The distinction between software and program is impor-
tant, because it makes clear that software design and pro-
gram design are distinct activities.  Program design fo-
cuses on producing detailed descriptions of the activities 
within a computer; software design focuses on wider 
descriptions aimed at characterising problems and solu-
tions both inside and outside the machine.  Consequently, 
while software design includes program design, software 
design is not reducible to program design.  The properties 
that are expected of programs in program design should 
not automatically be expected of software in software 
design. 
Notwithstanding this, researchers in software design of-
ten use programming theory as the inspiration for their 
work.  Programming theory however is bound to a certain 
philosophical assumptions.  Although software design 
methods rarely share all the philosophical assumptions of 
program design methods, few design methods appear to 
see this as a problem.  However, a problem does exist 
when designers unconsciously adopt philosophical posi-
tions unsupported by the design methods they are using.  
The behaviour expected of the world by the design 
method may not match the actual behaviour — if design-
ers are unaware of this conflict, they may continue to use 
unsuitable design methods. 
In this paper we argue that by un-picking the philosophi-
cal arguments, a broader framework can be established.  
This broader framework1 moves away from a single, uni-
fied, view of Information Systems design.  Instead, we 
argue for software design being underpinned by a series 
of theories that we describe as 'ad hoc', by which we 
mean, “devoted, appointed to or for some particular pur-
pose” (Simpson J. and Weiner E. 1989).  Using these ad 
hoc theories, allows us to understand more clearly the 
empirical behaviour of software development under these 
different philosophical assumptions.  Thus, studying dif-
ferent ad hoc theories should lead to a better empirical 
understanding of the process of software design. 
                                                                
1 This framework is described in more detail in the accompany-
ing paper, King D. and Kimble C. (2004) 
1. Properties of Descriptions 
1.1 What is a Description? 
In this paper, we concentrate on philosophical notions of 
epistemology and ontology.  Since the philosophical no-
tions often differ (Zúñiga G. 2001), we first need to de-
fine our terms2. 
To define what we mean by a ‘description’ we must start 
with a recognition that an unperceived universe exists: a 
universe beyond the reach of any individual designer.  
We will call this unperceived universe reality, defined as 
“…that which underlies and is the truth of appearances 
or phenomena” (Simpson J. and Weiner E. 1989).  In 
common with other philosophical discussions, the em-
phasis in this discussion is on what really exists, rather 
than existence as perceived by any individual designer 
(Audi R. 1995).  Notwithstanding this, the perceptions of 
an individual designer do matter and can be important to 
the success of the software design process (Sommerville 
I. and Sawyer P. 1997).  For example, different users 
have different views of the system being designed; it is 
only by capturing these different viewpoints that a de-
signer can fully understand the needs of the different 
users (Graham T. 1996).  Thus in software design, in 
addition to unperceived reality, we need a notion of the 
designer's ‘perceived reality’; we will call this ‘perceived 
reality’ the representation. 
In essence, the representation can be thought of as the 
mental model that an individual designer uses to 
characterise perceived reality.  The representation can 
therefore be defined as “[t]he operation of the mind in 
forming a clear image or concept” (Simpson J. and 
Weiner E. 1989).  However, these mental models are 
internal to the designer and are not directly transmissible.  
Instead, some intermediate form is needed; a form we 
will call the description.  We will simply define a 
description as “[a] statement which describes, sets forth, 
or portrays’’ (Simpson J. and Weiner E. 1989). 
Having offered a working definition for the terms de-
scription, representation and reality, we will now turn to 
the terms that link these concepts: information and 
knowledge.  We will start with the relationship between 
reality and representation. 
Essentially, this relationship characterises the representa-
tion as the result of the reception of stimuli from reality.  
Following Charles Meadow and Weijing Yuan (1997), 
we will refer to this as information.  Philosophically, we 
view the properties of the information relationship as the 
concern of ontology.  Ontological arguments are con-
                                                                
2 We have chosen to use standard dictionary definitions where 
possible.  Although we recognise that these definitions may 
imply a particular philosophical position, it is not our intention 
to advocate any single position here. 
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cerned with the nature of reality; without any concern for 
how that nature might be ‘known’. 
By contrast, the formation of a description from a repre-
sentation is a conscious act; a designer knowingly 
chooses the form of the description.  We will therefore 
refer to this relationship as knowledge.  Philosophically, 
we view the properties of the knowledge relationship as 
the concern of Epistemology.  Epistemological arguments 
are those that focus on the study and characterisation of 
knowledge. 
1.2 The Use of Philosophy 
All five terms defined in §1.1 are briefly summarised 
pictorially in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 –Summary of Definitions and Terms 
Although our choice of working definition for the term 
‘knowledge’ may seem controversial, it is not our inten-
tion to enter into arguments about the various distinctions 
that can be made between the terms ‘knowledge’ and 
‘information’ here.  Instead of looking for a single uni-
versal definition of ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ here, 
we are only concerned with the ad hoc notions of 
‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ that software designers 
use in their work. 
The aim of software design is to create descriptions that 
communicate characterisations of both a problem and its 
solution.  Consequently, the properties of the description 
used by the software designer critically affect the com-
municational ability of the design.  This means the suc-
cess of the software rests on the ability of the designer to 
create rich, high-quality descriptions. 
Most discussions of software design focus on the low-
level properties of a particular style of description or 
method of software design.  However, software descrip-
tions also have broad, high-level properties that are often 
ignored.  It is these high-level properties that most affect 
a designer’s ability to create rich, high-quality descrip-
tions and it is these properties that are discussed in this 
paper.  To discuss these properties of software descrip-
tions more fully we must turn to philosophy. 
1.3 Philosophy and design 
In this section, we will outline four broad approaches to 
software design and discuss their philosophical underpin-
nings.  These approaches and their associated philosophi-
cal underpinning are summarised in Table 1 overleaf.  
We will begin our discussion with the oldest and argua-
bly the most influential of all methods: formal methods. 
Historically, formal methods arose from the debates of 
the rationalist school of philosophy.  Rationalist argu-
ments deal principally with epistemology3, and broadly 
claim, “Reason is the source of all knowledge”.  Hence, 
“[i]f reason is the source of all knowledge, then every-
thing that can be known including the natural world must 
be intelligible and rationally explicable” (Jack A. 1993).  
As Jack notes, most rationalist positions argue that not 
only can all knowledge be uncovered by rational thought, 
but so too can the properties of the natural world.  This 
latter point is important, because rationalist epistemo-
logical arguments are often tied to realist ontological4 
arguments.  Realism “emphasises that truth is possible: 
beliefs are testable against ‘reality’, and that reality is 
‘knowable’ ” (Duro P. et. al. 1993). 
Design methods that argue from realist ontologies and 
rationalist epistemologies form the formal strand of re-
search in software design.  Here there is a seamless 
equivalence between the software description, the repre-
sentation in the designers mind and the underlying as-
pects of reality that are being modelled. 
In practice however, most design methods choose to 
abandon either the assumption of rationality, or the as-
sumption of realism.  Thus, although common in pro-
gram design methods, few software design methods ad-
here fully to the principals of the formal design methods.  
Nevertheless, these principals have been, and remain, 
hugely influential. 
As indicated above, the earliest software design methods 
were derived directly from program design methods.  
However, as many researchers have noted, the translation 
between description and reality is not a trivial problem.  
Consequently, many software designs methods have cho-
sen to recognise, sometimes only implicitly, a distinction 
between logical and physical designs. 
Software designs that were logically correct do not al-
ways reflect the properties the same software design has 
in reality.  Consequently, software design methods in the 
semi-formal strand try to manage the divide between 
logical and physical design rather than ignoring it. 
Recognising a split between logical and physical designs 
means basing software design methods on rationalist 
epistemological arguments and anti-realist ontological 
arguments.  Anti-realist arguments claim that the percep-
tion of reality is so bound to the mind observing reality 
that (Kant I. 1996): 
Even if we could impart the highest degree of clearness 
to our intuition, we should not come one step nearer to 
the nature of objects by themselves. 
                                                                
3 Epistemology is concerned with theories of knowledge, asking: 
“What can we know and how do we know it”? 
4 Ontology is concerned with theories of existence, asking: 
“What is the essence and nature of the world”? 
Description Representation Reality
Knowledge Information
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Anti-realist arguments therefore reject the assumption 
that logical properties of a description are guaranteed to 
hold in reality. 
However, most software design methods remain attracted 
to the notion of a seamless equivalence between the soft-
ware description and the underlying reality.  So rather 
than abandoning the realist ontological arguments, mod-
ern design methods more often abandon the rationalist 
epistemological arguments. 
Design methods in the object-oriented strand argue for a 
reversal of the assumptions made by the semi-formal 
strand.  Rather than working from the description to real-
ity, work from reality to the description.  Instead of using 
a rationalist epistemology, these design methods use an 
empiricist epistemology.  Empiricism argues for knowl-
edge as the result of observation and experience.  Rather 
than deriving reality from a perfect, rational, description, 
empiricist design methods seek to deduce features of the 
description from reality. 
Nonetheless, design methods in the object-oriented strand 
argue that once the description is formed from observa-
tion of reality, the description and reality will remain 
synchronised.  Thus, the description can be manipulated 
to reveal properties of reality.  Design methods in the 
object-oriented strand thus preserve realist ontologies. 
Finally, a few design methods abandon both rationalist 
epistemologies and realist ontologies.  For example, in 
Peter Checkland’s Soft System Methodology (SSM), 
software designers are not allowed to assume that proper-
ties of the description always have a physical counterpart 
(Checkland 1981).  Instead, relationships between fea-
tures of the software design and reality are always a mat-
ter of conjecture, and always open to challenge.  We will 
say that design methods that fall into this strand of re-
search are holistic design methods. 
A crude classification of software design methods by 
philosophical inclination produces the four categories, 
shown in Table 1; examples of the design methods asso-
ciated with each category are given in Table 2. 
 
Research 
Strand 
Epistemological 
Position 
Ontological 
Position 
Formal Rationalist Realist 
Semi-Formal Rationalist Anti-Realist 
Object-Oriented Empiricist Realist 
Holistic Empiricist Anti-Realist 
Table 1 – Philosophical Positions by Research Strand 
 
Research 
Strand 
Design  
Methods 
Formal Unity, Z, VDM 
Semi-Formal Jackson System Development  
Object-Oriented Booch Object Oriented Design 
Holistic Soft Systems, Multiview 
Table 2 – Design Methods by Research Strand 
We recognise that finer points of distinction could be 
made and that ontological and epistemological arguments 
are rarely orthogonal, nonetheless we claim the distinc-
tions in Table 1 are sufficiently fine to act as valid foun-
dations for different ad hoc theories of software. 
1.4 Theories of Software 
By a theory of software, we mean a theory capable of 
characterising the descriptions used in software design.  
In program design, an underlying theory of programming 
(i.e. a theory of computation) characterises all possible 
valid programs.  By tradition, the formal theory of pro-
grams is the only theory recognised as a valid foundation 
for software design. 
A key problem for a theory of software design however, 
is that each of the philosophical positions described 
above has a distinct notion of equivalence.  In King D. 
and Kimble C. (2004), we consider the precise differ-
ences in the notion of equivalence between the four posi-
tions, but in this paper, we will take equivalence to mean 
an isomorphic relationship between the things at either 
side of the relationship.  Thus, for example, equivalence 
(denoted by ‘≡’ in figure 2) between description and rep-
resentation means things can be mapped between the 
description and representation, without changing the 
meaning of the relationship.  This notion of equivalence 
characterises a rationalist position where no distinction 
exists between descriptions and representations.  In con-
trast, empiricist positions make a distinction between 
observations and the recording of observations: descrip-
tion and representation are not isomorphic, and so not 
equivalent. 
Looking at figure 2 overleaf, we can see a summary of 
the different equivalence relationships between descrip-
tions, representations and reality for each of the four 
strands.  Each of the four philosophical positions is fun-
damentally different and none can easily be reconciled 
with the others.  Consequently, rather than attempting to 
define a single, unified theory of software design, we 
advocate a move towards an ad hoc theory of design 
where a particular theory is devoted to a particular pur-
pose to which it is most suited. 
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1.5 The move to ad hoc theories 
The influence of formal strand of software design is so 
powerful and all pervasive that software designers are 
reluctant to explicitly create a software design method 
that does not have a notion of equivalence similar to that 
found in formal theories.  However, this frequently 
means software design methods attempt to retrofit other, 
inappropriate, notions of equivalence onto formal theo-
ries, which inevitably leads to problems. 
We argue that this effort is misplaced for the following 
reasons. 
1. The concepts of 'software' and 'programs' are 
distinct.  Although the term’s ‘software’ and ‘pro-
gram’ are often used interchangeably, most re-
searchers draw some distinction between ‘software 
design’ and ‘program design’.  In the early years, 
the problems faced by designers focused clearly on 
the machine.  However, as problems became larger 
designers quickly realised that the computer-
oriented focus did not always help.  Gradually these 
descriptions of the ‘larger-purposes’ of the program 
became known as software.  Software design is now 
recognised as a broader activity than program de-
sign.  Thus, there is good reason to expect that a 
theory of software (characterising all software de-
sign) will differ from a theory of programs (charac-
terising all program design). 
2. Software designers already use ad hoc theories of 
software.  The language software designers choose 
to use to describe software matters because it must 
be able to describe the, often complicated, situations 
found in the real world.  Languages that force the 
designer to spell out the relationship in order to en-
force formal equivalence may simply end up intro-
ducing unnecessary detail into the description.  For 
example, object-oriented design methods recognise 
that not all relationships between descriptions of en-
tities and objects in the real world are static.  Occa-
sionally designers might discover new properties of 
objects in reality, forcing an update in the descrip-
tions of entities.  Object-oriented design methods 
therefore need (and use) a notion of “equivalent un-
til further notice”: a notion that does not exist in 
formal theory.  Thus, although software design is of-
ten inspired by program design, the particular needs 
of software design force the designer to search for 
ad hoc solutions. 
3. No single position explains all behaviour of soft-
ware.  Lehman (2001) examined the behaviour of 
several large software projects.  He divides software 
projects between two categories of software.  He 
calls software completely characterised by a formal 
specification of the software behaviour Specifica-
tion-Type Software (S-Type Software).  All other 
categories of software are placed in the category of 
Embedded-Type Software (E-Type Software), be-
Figure 2 – Notions of equivalence in different ad hoc theories of software 
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cause the software is embedded in an inherently 
non-formal world.  For Lehman, all software should 
be S-Type, because formal theories form the central 
foundations for all program designs.  Lehman hy-
pothesises that as S-Type blocks of software as built 
together, the complexity of the world works to de-
grade the properties of the individual blocks and the 
software ceases to behave according to the demands 
of formal theory.  Thus, as the behaviour of software 
does not conform to the behaviour expected of de-
scriptions using only formal notions of equivalence, 
this diversity of behaviour argues for a series of ad 
hoc theories of software, rather than a single unified 
theory of software. 
We have outlined our arguments against a unified theory 
of software design based on a single philosophical foun-
dation and for the use of ad hoc theories, each taking a 
particular philosophical stand without making any claims 
to universality.  Further, we argue that although, in prin-
ciple, any ad hoc theory could be used in any software 
design process, in practice the assumptions of some ad 
hoc theories will prove to have a better match with the 
reality of a particular software design process than others.  
It is this argument that we examine using empirical data 
in the next section of this paper. 
2. Empirical Testing 
Although the existence of ad-hoc theories of software 
may be accepted conceptually, a major practical chal-
lenge is identifying the conditions where the assumptions 
of a particular ad hoc theory and the reality of a particu-
lar software design process are likely to match.  Having 
briefly described the theoretical background to this work, 
the remainder of the paper will turn to the problem of 
evaluating this theoretical framework against the reality 
of software design. 
2.1 Uncovering empirical foundations 
One way of uncovering the conditions where the assump-
tions of a particular ad hoc theory might apply is to look 
for empirical support.  We can do this by taking the phi-
losophical positions in Table 1 and interpreting them at 
face value. 
For example, take the relationship between the descrip-
tion and reality.  Both formal and semi-formal methods 
of software design take a rationalist epistemological posi-
tion and argue that reality is governed by an immutable 
set of rules.  Thus, reality forms a stable base for the 
software design.  Formal methods of software design go 
further, adopting a realist ontological position and argu-
ing that the description is also governed by an immutable 
set of rules linked to reality.  Semi-formal methods how-
ever do not go this far and argue that while reality is gov-
erned by an immutable set of rules, designers are not 
always perfect at describing those rules. 
So, although both formal and semi-formal design meth-
ods see reality as being fixed, differences exist in the 
assumptions made about the way in which reality can be 
described.  While semi-formal design methods assume 
the description will inevitably change as more is learnt 
about a particular problem, formal design methods as-
sume that any ‘errors’ in the description can be discov-
ered and eliminated.  Formal design methods assume that 
all ‘errors’ in a description are trivial, because errors only 
occur when rules are misapplied.  By contrast, semi-
formal design methods allow not only for the misapplica-
tion of rules, but also for the rules themselves to be 
flawed.  In other words, there is an assumption that de-
scriptions in formal design methods are free of major 
errors while in semi-formal design methods descriptions 
are expected to contain non-trivial errors that will need to 
be corrected. 
By examining data from real software projects, we 
should be able to determine when these assumptions ap-
ply.  This in turn should allow us to make an empirical 
assessment of the applicability of a particular ad hoc the-
ory of software to a particular set of circumstances.  The 
next section of this paper presents the results of one at-
tempt to do just this using data from three large software 
development projects. 
2.2 An Example of Empirical Testing 
2.2.1 Background 
This example is based on three separate projects from 
Rolls Royce.  Each project is concerned with the devel-
opment of software for a control system for the same 
class of complex component.  Each component type has a 
number of distinct sub-types and the development of the 
software for each particular sub-type is tracked. 
The development of software for control systems is a 
well established and refined science.  The core principals 
and control laws are well known and the designers of 
control systems have access to a wealth of well docu-
mented engineering expertise.  Although the basic pattern 
for the control system is well known, the demands of 
specific customers vary; hence the need for specific sub-
types. 
Within each sub-project, development is divided into a 
number of stages.  These stages are not always linearly 
ordered; frequently pressures of time mean there is a 
considerable overlap between the stages.  Notwithstand-
ing this, each stage is effectively a full software devel-
opment cycle.  New requirements can be fed into a stage, 
assumptions changed and test results fed back.  Once the 
changes are made, the results are handed on to another 
stage, either during, or at the end of the stage, depending 
on the circumstances. 
All three projects in this example were developed using 
design methods following what we have characterised as 
the semi-formal approach.  As previously noted, Rolls-
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Royce has well developed engineering expertise in both 
the theoretical and practical design of control systems; 
consequently, we would expect the assumptions of the 
semi-formal design methods to be a good match for this 
particular example of software development. 
2.2.2 Checking Assumptions 
Following from our previous discussion, if a semi-formal 
approach to design was adopted, we would expect the 
descriptions to be stable, although the context of the de-
scription (the designer's representation of reality) would 
change. 
To turn these rather general assumptions into a set of 
criteria suitable for empirical testing we focused on two 
metrics for which data was readily available: errors in 
software requirements (ER) and other errors in the soft-
ware description (EO).  We then used the ratio of re-
quirements errors to other errors as a simple metric for 
uncovering whether the assumptions of the semi-formal 
design method held. 
For a semi-formal design method, if the descriptions are 
stable, then any errors in the descriptions should be rare.  
However, when the context of the description is unstable, 
then formulating stable requirements is difficult and we 
expect to see a number of requirements errors.  Thus in 
the unstable conditions of real software design projects, 
we would expect "other errors" to be rare (i.e. EO ≈ 0) 
with most errors occurring errors in the specification of 
requirements (i.e. ER > 0). 
The positions of the other three design methods can be 
deduced by following similar reasoning and are summa-
rised in Table 3 below. 
Research 
Strand 
ER EO 
Formal ≈ 0 ≈ 0 
Semi-Formal ≈ 0 > 0 
Object-Oriented > 0 ≈ 0 
Holistic > 0 > 0 
Table 3 – Assumptions by Software Research Strand 
2.2.3 Results 
Figure 3 shows the results from all three projects, in the 
form of a scatter plot.  To construct this diagram the data 
for the number of requirements and other errors was di-
vided into percentiles and ranked.  For both the number 
of requirements and other errors, values in the first quar-
tile were taken to be ≈ 0.  Values ranked at, or above the 
25th percentile were taken to be > 0.  Thus, the X and Y 
axes in the graph shown in Figure 3 are drawn at the 25th 
percentiles. 
Looking at Figure 3, we can see that most values lie 
above the 25th percentiles.  We can therefore conclude 
that for most development stages both ER > 0 and EO > 0.  
This is a somewhat surprising result as this pattern fits 
the assumptions of the holistic design method better than 
the of the semi-formal design method that was supposed 
to be being used. 
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Figure 3 – Distribution of Errors (by Percentile) in Rolls-Royce Data 
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We can show the breakdown of the matches for the four 
sets of assumptions underpinning different design meth-
ods more clearly by simply classifying each development 
stage according to which box it fits in Figures 3.  Apply-
ing this simple classification to each of the three projects 
gives us the results shown in Figure 4. 
This shows more clearly which stages of the design proc-
ess match with which set of assumptions.  Thus, stages 
from the top right hand box (X and Y over the 25th per-
centile) can be tagged holistic.  Similarly, stages in the 
bottom left hand box (X and Y under the 25th percentile) 
can be tagged as best suited to the assumptions of the 
formal design methods.  We can now see clearly that the 
majority of stages actually followed the assumptions of 
the holistic design methods, with only one stage in one 
project following the assumptions of the semi-formal 
design methods that were supposed to be being used. 
Interestingly, for both Project 1 and Project 2, most 
stages were either stable (which would follow the as-
sumptions of the formal design methods), or unstable 
(which would follow the assumptions of the holistic de-
sign methods). 
3. Conclusions 
Focusing on the differences between the different phi-
losophical positions underpinning different software de-
sign methods is useful: both from a practical and theo-
retical perspective.  Most discussions of software design 
methods have aimed to establish a single, unified theory 
of software.  These unified theories broadly follow the 
philosophical assumptions of formal programming the-
ory.  By making a distinction between software and pro-
grams, we draw two conclusions.  Firstly, in reality, soft-
ware designers adopt a broad range of philosophical posi-
tions most of which are not trivially reconcilable to those 
underpinning formal programming theory.  Secondly, we 
can see no single philosophical position that exactly 
characterises the empirical behaviour of software 
development.  This pattern of changing assumptions is 
repeated at a finer grained analysis of the software design 
process.  For example, by examining each of the stages in 
the above examples we have shown that even characteris-
ing the development of a single stage in terms of one set 
of philosophical assumptions is difficult. 
Some philosophical assumptions however appear to be 
more widely applicable than others are.  For instance, 
patterns of behaviour we characterised as following the 
holistic position are the most common.  Based on this 
work, it seems unlikely that, for the majority of software 
design processes, a single set of assumptions will ever be 
applicable. 
One question that is not answered by this work is how far 
software designers can force the application of a particu-
lar set of assumptions.  For instance, how far can soft-
ware designers stabilise the requirements to favour the 
assumptions they need to make to use an object-oriented 
or formal design method?  Successful software design 
projects may simply have succeeded in forcing the appli-
cation of particular methods of software design! 
Whether or not a design method can direct the thinking of 
a designer, the designers must be continuously aware of 
the assumptions they are making.  We have seen that at 
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some point the assumptions made by the designer and 
those made by the design method are likely to diverge.  
Whether this divergence is significant will depend on 
individual circumstances.  Nonetheless, by embracing ad 
hoc theories (with narrow, distinct philosophical assump-
tions) designers are more likely to become aware of po-
tential problems.  By preserving the ability of designers 
to criticise their own assumptions, designers should gain 
a broader understanding of the strengths and weaknesses 
of particular methods.  Backing this understanding with 
empirical studies should help to move the discipline of 
Information Systems onto a much firmer philosophical 
foundation.  Rather than weakening the understanding of 
software, we believe that ad hoc theories offer a way 
towards a stronger and more grounded future for software 
design. 
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